Abstract. Recent studies have shown that robust affective priming effects can be obtained when participants are required to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence, but not when participants are asked to categorize the targets on the basis of nonaffective features. On the basis of this pattern of results, it has been argued that affective priming is due to processes that operate at a response selection stage rather than to processes that operate at an encoding stage. We demonstrate (a) that affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses can be obtained when participants assign attention to the affective stimulus dimension, and (b) that affective priming in the standard evaluative categorization task is strongly reduced when participants assign attention to nonaffective stimulus features. On the basis of these findings, we argue (a) that processes operating at an encoding stage do contribute to the affective priming effect, and (b) that automatic affective stimulus processing is reduced when participants selectively attend to nonaffective stimulus features.
As early as the beginning of the previous century, renowned scientists suspected that humans are endowed with an evaluative decision mechanism that allows them to automatically evaluate all incoming stimulus information (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bartlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980 Zajonc, , 1984 . In accordance with this hypothesis, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) demonstrated that participants need less time to judge the affective connotation of a target stimulus (e.g., the word "UGLY") after the presentation of an affectively related prime stimulus (e.g., the word "HATE") than after the presentation of an affectively unrelated prime stimulus (e.g., the word "FLOWER"). It has since been demonstrated that this affective priming effect is based on fast-acting processes and does not depend upon the conscious identification of the primes, nor on the presence of ample processing resources or an explicit evaluative processing goal (for reviews, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003) .
Recent studies have shown, however, that the affective priming effect typically fails to replicate when participants are asked to categorize targets on the basis of nonaffective stimulus features. Consider, for instance, Experiment 4 of Klinger, Burton, and Pitts (2000) . In this study, participants were presented with masked primes that were either related or unrelated to the targets on two semantic dimensions: valence (positive vs. negative) and animacy (living vs. nonliving) . In addition, Klinger et al. (2000) manipulated the nature of the response task: Whereas one group of participants was asked to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence, a second group of participants was asked to make animacy judgments. Despite the fact that identical stimulus materials were used in both conditions, Klinger et al. (2000) observed that significant affective priming occurred only when participants categorized the targets on the basis of their valence. Similar results were reported by De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, and Wentura (2002) . Using visible primes, they obtained significant affective priming when participants responded on the basis of the valence of the targets, but not when the semantic category (person or object) was relevant (Experiment 2). Likewise, Klauer and Musch (2002) failed to obtain the affective priming effect when participants categorized the targets on the basis of their location on the computer screen (Experiment 1), color (Experiment 2), letter case (Experiment 3), or grammatical category (Experiment 4), whereas strong affective priming effects were readily obtained in each of these experiments when participants were asked to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence. Recently, we also failed to obtain significant affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses when using affectively polarized pictures as primes and targets (Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003) .
Based on this pattern of results, several researchers have openly questioned the viability of the so-called encoding account of affective priming (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger et al., 2000) . According to this account, affective priming effects emerge because affectively polarized prime stimuli preactivate the memory representations of affectively related targets to an extent that it becomes easier to encode targets with the same valence than targets with a different valence (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen,& Eelen, in press ; see also Bargh, 1997) . Because such a process is assumed to be operative irrespective of the nature of the response task, the observation that the affective priming effect typically fails to replicate in nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks is indeed inconsistent with an encoding account. A response level account of affective priming, on the other hand, fits nicely with the observation that affective priming effects are dependent upon the nature of the response task. According to this account, affective priming effects can come about only if affectively polarized prime stimuli can trigger response tendencies that facilitate/interfere with target responding. Unlike in the standard evaluative categorization task, this is not the case in nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks. Accordingly, the observation that the affective priming effect is readily obtained with the evaluative categorization task but fails to replicate in nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks seems to corroborate the hypothesis that affective priming is primarily driven by processes that operate at response selection stage (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger et al., 2000) .
It should be pointed out, however, that an alternative, as yet untested, explanation can be formulated to account for the fact that the affective priming effect typically fails to replicate in nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks. A crucial difference between the evaluative categorization task and nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks is that participants are required to assign attention to affective stimulus features in the evaluative categorization task whereas selective attention for nonaffective stimulus features is required in nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks. This difference may be crucial to account for the conflicting results that are obtained with the evaluative categorization task and nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks, since research on human categorization has demonstrated that people can flexibly allocate attention to specific stimulus dimensions as a function of current goals and task demands (e.g., Goldstone & Steyvers, 2001; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nososfky, 1986 Nososfky, , 1991 see also Haider & Frensch, 1996) . More specifically, it could be hypothesized that the null-findings typically found with nonaffective (semantic) categorization tasks are simply due to the fact that automatic affective stimulus processing is hampered when participants selectively assign attention to nonaffective (semantic) stimulus features.
This hypothesis has important implications. For example, assuming that processes operating at an encoding level do contribute to the affective priming effect, one could argue that it should be possible to find significant affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses if the broader experimental context encourages participants to process the affective stimulus dimension. Conversely, one could also predict that the affective priming effect will be less likely to emerge, even in the evaluative categorization task, if the broader experimental context causes participants to ignore the affective stimulus dimension.
These hypotheses were tested in Experiment 1. In this study, two groups of participants were tested with the same stimulus materials. The first group was asked to categorize affectively polarized target pictures of animals and objects on the basis of their valence, unless the targets were presented in the center of a rectangle. In that case, participants were instructed to categorize the targets as "objects" or "animals." In the second group, participants were asked to categorize the target pictures as referring to "objects" or "animals," unless they were presented in the center of a rectangle. In that case, participants were asked to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence. Importantly, the targets were framed on only 25% of the trials. Thus, the affective dimension was relevant more often than nonaffective semantic dimensions in the first group (hereinafter referred to as the 75% evaluation condition) whereas nonaffective semantic dimensions were relevant more often than the affective dimension in the second group (hereinafter referred to as the 25% evaluation condition). Assuming that processes operating at an encoding stage always contribute to the affective priming effect when affective stimulus information is processed, we predicted that significant affective priming would emerge in the 75% evaluation condition, irrespective of whether the targets were classified on the basis of their valence or on the basis of their nonaffective semantic category membership. Conversely, assuming that automatic affective stimulus information is reduced when participants are focusing on nonaffective stimulus features, we predicted that the affective priming effect would fail to replicate in the 25% evaluation condition, both on nonaffective semantic categorization trials and evaluative categorization trials.
Experiment 1 Method Participants
Forty University of Leuven students (6 men, 34 women) volunteered to participate in exchange for course credit. All participants were native speakers of Dutch and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials
Positive and negative pictures were used as primes and targets. All pictures were selected on the basis of a preliminary rating study in which participants (N = 51) rated the affective connotation of 215 real life color pictures (512 pixels wide, 384 pixels high, 24 bits per pixel) 1 on a 11-point rating scale ranging from -5 (very negative) to +5 (very positive). The target pictures portrayed either animals (3 positive, 3 negative) or objects (3 positive, 3 negative), whereas the prime pictures (8 positive, 8 negative) por-trayed more complex real life scenes (see Appendix). Importantly, none of the prime pictures portrayed an animal or an object. Positive target pictures were evaluated more positively than negative target pictures, M negative = -1.83 (SE = 0.28), M positive = 1.99 (SE = 0.20), t(10) = 11.00, p < .001. Likewise, positive prime pictures were evaluated more positively than negative prime pictures, M negative = -3.11 (SE = 0.37), M positive = 2.57 (SE = 0.15), t(14) = 14.09, p < .001.
The experiment was run on an AMD Athlon 1900 computer (64 MB VRAM) and all pictures were presented against the black background of a 19-inch computer monitor (100 Hz, screen resolution 1024 × 768). An Affect 3.0 program (Hermans, Clarysse, Baeyens, & Spruyt, 2003) controlled the presentation of the stimuli as well as the registration of the response latencies. An external voice key that was connected to the parallel port of the computer was used to register the response latencies.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit and soundproof room. They were informed that they were about to participate in a picture recognition experiment and that their task would be to categorize a series of pictures by pronouncing their category name. In the 75% evaluation condition, participants were asked to categorize the pictures on the basis of their valence by saying the Dutch word for "positive" or "negative", unless the pictures appeared in a green frame. These pictures were to be categorized as objects or animals by saying the Dutch word for object or animal. In the 25% evaluation condition, participants were asked to categorize the pictures as objects or animals, unless the pictures appeared in a green frame. These pictures were to be categorized on the basis of their valence.
Before the start of the experiment, both groups completed a practice phase consisting of 24 trials. During this practice phase, all targets were presented twice in a random order and participants were asked to categorize the targets by pronouncing their category name out loud. On 25% of these trials the target was framed so that participants were required to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence on exactly 18 trials and 6 trials in the 75% evaluation condition and the 25% evaluation condition, respectively. Each target was presented until the voice key was triggered and the experimenter corrected the participants if necessary.
After the practice phase, participants completed the affective priming task. To familiarize the participants with the priming procedure, 8 warm-up trials were presented. These warm-up trials consisted of a randomly selected prime and target and the frame was never presented on these trials. Then the experimental trials were presented. In both groups all possible prime-target pairs (16 primes × 12 targets = 192 trials) were presented exactly once and in both groups 25% of the targets was framed with a green rectangle. To ensure that the nature of the categorization task (evaluative categorization vs. nonaffective semantic categorization) would not be confounded with the valence of the targets (positive vs. negative) or the prime-target relationship (affective related vs. affectively unrelated), we made sure to frame each of the four possible trial types (positive-positive, negative-positive, positive-negative, negative-negative) equally often.
Each trial started with a 500-ms presentation of a fixation cross. Then, after an inter stimulus interval of 500 ms, the prime was presented for 200 ms. Finally, 50 ms after the offset of the prime (SOA 250 ms), the target was presented until the participant gave a response or 2000 ms elapsed. The experimenter coded whether the microphone was accurately triggered and whether the participant's response was correct by pressing one of three keys on the computer keyboard. After the experimenter entered the code, the next trial was initiated after a time interval that varied randomly between 500 ms and 1,500 ms.
Results

Reaction Time Data
The data from trials on which an incorrect response was given (8.14% of all trials) were excluded from the reaction time analyses. Data from trials on which the voice key was not appropriately activated (7.67% of all trials) were also discarded. Finally, in order to reduce the impact of outliers, response latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant's conditional mean latency were discarded (2.37% of all trials). After computing mean response latencies for each cell of the design, the remaining data were subjected to a 2 (categorization context: 75% evaluation trials vs. 25% evaluation trials) × 2 (trial type: evaluative categorization trials vs. nonaffective semantic categorization trials) × 2 (affective congruence: affectively related vs. affectively unrelated) ANOVA. Detailed descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 .
The ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between categorization context and trial type, F(1, 38) = 291.67, p < .001, MSE = 6,021.73. In the 75% evaluation condition, evaluative categorization trials (M = 686 ms) were responded to faster than nonaffective semantic categorization trials (M = 882 ms). In contrast, nonaffective semantic categorization trials (M = 702 ms) were responded to faster than evaluative categorization trials (M = 926 ms) in the 25% evaluation condition. The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between affective congruence and categorization context, F(1, 38) = 5.49, p < .05, MSE = 1,290.62. Further analyses showed that the effect of affective congruence was significant in the 75% evaluation condition, F(1, 19) = 10.01, p < .01, MSE = 1,006.07, but not in the 25% evaluation condition, F < 1. Importantly, both in the 75% evaluation condition and the 25% evaluation condition, the interaction between affective congruency and trial type was statistically unreliable, F values < 1.05. That is, the effect of affective congruence reached significance in the 75% evaluation condition irrespective of whether the targets were classified on the basis of their valence, t(19) = 2.96, p < .005, or on the basis of their nonaffective semantic category membership, t(19) = 1.76, p < .05 (one-sided t tests). In the 25% evaluation condition, on the other hand, neither with the evaluative categorization trials nor with the nonaffective semantic categorization trials a significant effect of affective congruence could be detected (t values < 1).
Distributional Reaction Time Analysis
In line with our predictions, the affective congruency effect reached significance in the 75% evaluation condition only, irrespective of whether the targets were classified on the basis of their valence or on the basis of their nonaffective semantic category membership. It could be argued, however, that this pattern of results emerged because participants were biased to respond conform the dominant task on all trials and switched to the secondary task only after internally categorizing the targets conform the dominant classification principle. In the 75% evaluation condition, for example, participants may have been inclined to internally categorize targets of nonaffective semantic categorization trials on the basis of their valence before responding on the basis of nonaffective semantic category membership. As a consequence, the affective priming effect that emerged on nonaffective semantic categorization trials may have been an artifact of the internal evaluative categorization being affectively primed. Moreover, assuming that the affective priming effect dissipates rather quickly, the same logic could account for the lack of affective priming of evaluative categorization responses in the 25% evaluation condition.
To examine this possibility, we conducted additional reaction time analyses in which reaction time distributions for each priming condition were divided into three 1/3-bins (see De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994) . If the affective priming effect that was obtained with nonaffective semantic categorization trials in the 75% evaluation condition was due to the fact that participants internally categorized the targets on the basis of their valence before responding, affective priming in this condition should increase as a function of increasing levels of the bin variable. However, the reverse is true: Affective priming of nonaffective categorization responses reached significance in the first bin only, t(19) = 2.25, p < .05, M congruent = 696 ms, M incongruent = 722 ms (two-sided). A similar analysis of the 25% evaluative categorization condition revealed no significant affective priming effects for any of the bin × trial type conditions (all t values < 1). Moreover, in line with the standard reaction time analysis, the crucial interaction between affective congruence and categorization context proved to be significant in the first bin, F(1, 38) = 6.34, p < .05, MSE = 820.06. In sum, it seems unlikely that our findings resulted from participants switching to the secondary task only after internally categorizing the targets on the basis of the dominant task.
2
Error Data
No effects emerged in the error data. Wilcoxon tests for matched pairs revealed that the effect of affective congruency was statistically unreliable in each of the 4 experimental conditions (all p values > .28). 
Discussion
The results are clear-cut. When participants were asked to respond on the basis of the valence of the target stimuli on the majority of trials, reliable affective priming effects were found both with evaluative categorization trials and nonaffective semantic categorization trials. In contrast, affective priming occurred neither on the evaluative categorization trials nor on the nonaffective semantic categorization trials when nonaffective semantic categorization responses were required on the majority of trials. These results are important for two reasons. First of all, they provide important information about the nature of the underlying processes that contribute to the affective priming effect. Just as in the studies of De Houwer et al. (2002) and Klinger et al. (2000) , we manipulated the nonaffective semantic category of the targets independently of their valence. Because of this, affectively congruent and affectively incongruent primes could not influence response selection differentially on nonaffective semantic categorization trials. Nevertheless, significant affective priming was obtained with the nonaffective semantic categorization trials in the 75% evaluation condition. This finding strongly argues against the hypothesis that affective priming can be due to processes that operate at a response selection stage only (e.g., De Houwer et al. 2002; Klauer, 1998; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997; Klinger et al., 2000; Musch, Klauer, & Mierke, 2004; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 1999 Wentura, , 2000 . In contrast, the finding that nonaffective semantic categorization responses can be affectively primed is easily explained on the basis of an encoding account of affective priming. According to such an account, affectively polarized primes preactivate the memory representations of affectively related targets processes, thereby making it easier to encode targets with the same valence than targets with a different valence (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer et al., 2001; Ferguson et al., 2005; Spruyt et al., 2002, in press; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004 ; see also Bargh, 1997) . On the basis of the present findings, it can thus be concluded that processes that operate at an encoding level do contribute to the affective priming effect.
Second, the present findings are also important because they suggest that automatic affective stimulus processing may be modulated by the extent to which participants selectively allocate attention to nonaffective semantic stimulus dimensions. According to this viewpoint, the likelihood or degree of automatic affective stimulus processing depends on the extent to which the experimental context, as a whole, encourages participants to assign attention to the affective stimulus dimension. The fact that no affective priming was obtained with the evaluative categorization trials in the 25% evaluation condition whereas robust affective priming effects emerged on the nonaffective evaluative categorization trials in the 75% evaluation condition is in accordance with this view.
3
Experiment 2
To test whether our findings generalize to other stimulus materials, words instead of pictures were used as primes and targets in Experiment 2. Following Klinger et al. (2000, Experiment 4) , we used target words that varied on the valence dimension as well as the animacy dimension, and participants were asked to categorize the targets words on the basis their nonaffective semantic category membership (living vs. nonliving). Crucially, in addition to the animacy categorization task, participants were also asked to count how many times the prime words (adjectives) were positive or negative. Thus, although participants responded on the basis of the nonaffective category of the targets on 100% of the trials, they were also required to assign attention to the affective stimulus dimension. Consequently, we expected to observe significant affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses.
4
Method Participants
Thirty five University of Leuven students (18 men, 17 women) volunteered to participate in exchange for course credit. All participants were native speakers of Dutch and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials
Targets were 30 positive and 30 negative nouns. Within each valence category, 15 targets referred to a living concept (e.g., "BABY," "GANGSTER") whereas 15 targets referred to a nonliving concept (e.g., "PERFUME," "LIT-3 One could argue that the null-findings that emerged on the evaluative categorization trials in the 25% evaluation condition may have been due to the fact that we did not present enough evaluation trials to capture the effect (only 25% of all trials). For two reasons, however, we believe that such an explanation is improbable. First, given that the total number of trials was relatively large (i.e., 196 trials), the number of evaluation trials in the 25% evaluation condition (i.e., 48 trials) should have been sufficient for the affective priming effect to be obtained. In fact, recently published studies indicate that the affective priming effect can be obtained with as few as 24 trials (e.g., Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004) . Second, and more importantly, it should be noted that we did obtain a significant affective priming effect with the 48 nonaffective semantic categorization trials that were presented in the 75% evaluation condition. For those reasons, it seems rather unlikely that the null-finding that was obtained with the evaluative categorization trials in the 25% evaluation condition was due to a Type-II error. 4 Experiment 2 is a (nearly exact) replication of an earlier study conducted in our lab (N = 40). The results of this study were virtually identical to those of Experiment 2.
TER"). Primes were 60 adjectives. Due to a programming error, however, only 29 of these prime words were negative (31 prime words were positive). A complete listing of the stimuli used in this experiment is provided in the Appendix. An external response box that was connected to the parallel port of the computer was used to register the response latencies. In all other aspects, the apparatuses used in this experiment were identical to that used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. Instructions presented on the computer screen informed the participants that they were about to participate in an experiment concerning implicit memory. They were told that pairs of words would be sequentially presented on the computer screen and that they would have to carry out two tasks simultaneously. Their primary task was to press a left or right key as quickly as possible on the basis of whether the second word referred to a living or a nonliving concept, respectively. Their secondary task was to count how many times the first word was positive or negative.
Participants completed 2 blocks of 60 trials each. For each block, the computer program assigned the 60 target words randomly to one of the 60 prime words, the only restriction being that the number of affectively congruent and affectively incongruent trials would be balanced.
5 After each block, participants were asked to write down how many times they had seen a positive or negative prime word.
Prior to the experimental phase, there were two practice phases. During the first practice phase, only the primary task was practiced. To that end, 5 nouns referring to a living concept and 5 nouns referring to nonliving concept were presented. These nouns were all relatively neutral as far as their affective connotation was concerned (e.g., "CHAIR," "GRASS"). Participants were asked to categorize these nouns on the animacy dimension as quickly as possible (living vs. nonliving). During the second practice phase, the secondary task was introduced. To that end, participants were presented with 20 trials consisting of random combinations of the 10 (affectively neutral) practice targets and 10 affectively polarized prime words (5 positive, 5 negative). None of the prime words that were presented during the second practice phase was later used during the experimental phase of the experiment. At the end of the second practice phase, participants were asked to write down how many times they had seen a positive or negative prime word.
The temporal details on any given trial were identical to that used in Experiment 1, with to exceptions. First, target words were presented until a response was registered. Second, participants were required to press both keys of the response box simultaneously in order to initiate the next trial.
Results
Reaction Time Data
The data from trials on which an incorrect response was given (12.26% of all trials) were excluded from the reaction time analyses. In order to reduce the impact of outliers, response latencies deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant's conditional mean latency were also discarded (2.52% of all trials). The remaining data were subjected to a 2 (block: block 1 vs. block 2) × 2 (affective congruence: affectively related vs. affectively unrelated) repeated measures ANOVA.
The main effect of block reached significance, F(1, 34) = 38.89, p < .001, MSE = 25,107.25: Response latencies were faster in the second block (M = 687 ms) as compared to the first block (M = 935 ms). More importantly, the ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of affective congruency, F(1, 34) = 4.57, p < .05, MSE = 3,048.66: Response latencies were shorter for affectively congruent trials (M = 841 ms) as compared to affectively incongruent priming trials (M = 861 ms). The interaction between block and affective congruence was statistically unreliable, F < 1.
Error Data
Both in the first and the second block, the effect of affective congruency was statistically unreliable (p's > .85).
Discussion
In accordance with Experiment 1, the present study demonstrated that reliable affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses can be obtained if attention is assigned to the affective stimulus dimension. Because this result was obtained with a completely different set of stimuli, it seems highly unlikely that the findings of Experiment 1 were dependent upon the use of a specific stimulus set. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 thus provide convincing evidence for the idea that processes operating at an encoding level do contribute to the affective priming effect whenever affective stimulus information is processed. The present experiment is also important for a second reason. In Experiment 1, participants were encouraged to assign attention to affective stimulus information by presenting a large amount of evaluative categorization trials. In the present study, however, selective attention for A. Spruyt et al.: Affective Priming of Nonaffective Responses 49 affective stimulus information was induced by asking participants to count the number of positive and negative primes. Thus, the present findings suggest that various experimental manipulations can be used to influence the extent to which affective stimulus features are attended to.
General Discussion
Over the last few decades, there has been a surge of interest in the study of affect and emotion. Of particular interest has been the question whether affective stimulus information is processed automatically, an hypothesis advocated by researchers working in a variety of disciplines such as learning psychology (e.g., Martin & Levey, 1978) , social psychology (e.g., Bargh, 1996; Zajonc, 1980 Zajonc, , 1984 , psychophysiology (e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, & Klein, 1992) , and neurophysiology (e.g., LeDoux, 1989) . In line with this reasoning, previous affective priming studies that have shown that affective stimulus information can be processed very rapidly (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001) , with minimal effort (e.g., Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000) , and even outside the reach of consciousness (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998) . Accordingly, it has been concluded that the affective priming effect is a fairly unconditional phenomenon. The results of Experiment 1 suggest, however, that the affective priming effect may not be the unconditional phenomenon that several researchers have claimed it to be. In this study, irrespective of whether the targets were classified on the basis of their valence or on the basis of their nonaffective semantic category membership, affective priming emerged only if participants were required to affectively categorize the targets on the majority of trials. As argued above, this pattern of results can be explained by assuming (a) that participants selectively assigned attention to stimulus dimensions that were relevant for response selection on the dominant task, and (b) that automatic affective stimulus processing is reduced if nonaffective semantic stimulus dimensions are selectively attended to. We acknowledge that this viewpoint is somewhat speculative at the moment, yet it is striking to see many findings reported in the literature are consistent with these ideas.
Consider, for example, the fact that affective priming effects have been obtained with the naming task as well as the lexical decision task (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; De Houwer et al., 2001; Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994 Spruyt et al., 2002, in press; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004; Wentura, 1998 Wentura, , 2000 . In these tasks, all semantic stimulus features are equally relevant for response selection. It can thus be assumed that participants, when naming target words or judging their lexical status, divide their attention across various stimulus dimensions, including the inherently important affective stimulus dimension. Correspondingly, our framework predicts that significant affective priming will occur in these tasks, as is frequently observed (but see Klauer & Musch, 2001 ).
Our framework is also consistent with the so-called weapon identification studies of Payne (2001) . He presented participants with target pictures of guns and tools that were preceded by prime pictures of Black and White faces. Crucially, participants were asked to respond on the basis of whether the target picture was a tool or a weapon. Thus, in the nonaffective semantic categorization task that was employed by Payne (2001) , affective stimulus information was informative about the target's semantic category (tools being relatively neutral, or even positive, as compared to weapons). Accordingly, it can be assumed that participants were encouraged to assign attention to the affective stimulus dimension. In line with this reasoning, Payne (2001) obtained reliable affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses (see, for similar results, Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003; Payne, Shimizu, & Jacoby, 2005) .
There is also evidence stemming from the traditional semantic priming literature that is consistent with the idea that automatic stimulus information processing can be influenced by processes of selective attention. In semantic priming research, an intense discussion has been going for years about whether automatic priming can be found for semantically related prime-target pairs that are associatively unrelated (Lucas, 2000; McRae & Boisvert, 1998; Perea & Gotor, 1997; Shelton & Martin, 1992) . One finding that suggests that automatic nonassociative semantic priming may be a genuine phenomenon was reported by Schreuder, Flores d'Arcais, and Glazenborg (1984) and Flores d'Arcais, Schreuder, and Glazenborg (1985) . Using both a naming task and a lexical decision task, these authors obtained significant priming effects for word pairs that were "perceptually related" -that is, word pairs that were related because they referred to objects with the same shape (e.g., pizza-coin). However, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Raaijmakers (1998) reported that they were unable to replicate this perceptual priming effect unless participants were instructed to make explicit judgments about the perceptual properties of the word's referents prior to the priming task. On the basis of this finding, Pecher et al. (1998) concluded that perceptual priming can be obtained only if and to the extent that the global experimental context encourages participants to process the perceptual features of the presented concepts (see also Barsalou, 1993) . Although Pecher et al. (1998) did not explicitly link up their findings with the notion of feature-specific attention allocation, their results are consistent with the view that selective attention processes can influence the extent to which different stimulus properties can be automatically accessed.
In sum, the impact of feature-specific attention allocation on automatic stimulus processing appears to be a general phenomenon that can be induced by various experimental manipulations. Moreover, there is evidence that suggests that emotionally charged stimuli have no special power to grab or hold attention. Harris, Pashler, and Coburn (2004) , for example, consistently found that emotionally charged words are neither more readily detected as targets nor more potent as distractors than neutral words in a visual search task. For these reasons, we believe that it could be an inspiring enterprise to further examine the impact of attentional processes on (automatic) affective stimulus processing. 6 We hasten to confirm, however, that much more research is required to firmly substantiate the claim that feature-specific attention allocation can modulate the automatic processing of affective stimulus information. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the present studies were primarily designed to examine the nature of the processes that underlie the affective priming effect and that our findings do allow to draw firm conclusions for that matter. In two subsequent experiments we were able to obtain reliable affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses. In each of these studies, affectively congruent and affectively incongruent primes could not influence response selection differentially. Accordingly, these studies convincingly demonstrate that processes operating at an encoding level contribute to the affective priming effect.
